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Abstract—National bias in sports judging is a well-known issue
and has been observed in several sports: judges, in the aggregate,
give higher marks to athletes of the same nationality. In this
work, we study the national bias of international gymnastics
judges during the 2013–2016 Olympic cycle. As opposed to prior
work, our analysis leverages the intrinsic variance of the judging
error based on the performance level of the gymnasts for each
apparatus and discipline. The magnitude of the national bias
varies across judges, nations and disciplines. While acrobatics
and trampoline do not exhibit any bias, we observe considerable
bias by aerobics, artistics and rhythmics judges. In aerobic and
artistic gymnastics this bias further increases for the best athletes
competing in the finals. On the positive side, we show that judges
are unbiased against direct competitors of their own gymnasts.
Our approach could easily be applied to other sports that
incorporate a judging panel and objective judging guidelines. It
could help sports federations and the public at large understand
the extent of national bias and identify particularly prone judges
or nations.
Keywords: Sports judges, national bias, heteroscedasticity,
intrinsic judging variance, gymnastics
I. INTRODUCTION
Judging sports competitions is a challenging task. Despite a
myriad of technological advances, judges must assess the per-
formance of athletes live, surrounded by thousands of cheering
spectators, and according to hundreds of instructions specified
in scoring regulations. These evaluations anoint international
champions and Olympic medalists, and all the involved parties
– athletes, coaches, fans, officials, sponsors – have a vested
interest in having accurate and fair judges.
In this article we focus on the fairness aspect of judging.
Fair judges grade every performance as accurately as possible
without introducing any subjective biases into their evaluation.
There are many well-known biases in sports judging, and in
most cases it is impossible to determine whether theses biases
are intentional or not. The most studied and discussed bias in
sports is national bias. National bias comes in two flavors:
judges can favor athletes of the same nationality, and at the
same time penalize their close competitors. National bias was
shown to exist in many sports including figure skating [1],
[2], [3], ski jumping [2], rhythmic gymnastics [4], artistic
gymnastics [5], [6], Muay Thai boxing [7], diving [8] and
dressage [9].
The analytical approaches to identify national bias are man-
ifold. Early analyses use sign tests [5], [1], [4] or permutation
tests [10], whereas most recent models use linear regressions
[2], [7], [8], [6], [9]. Zitzewitz [2] links the appearance
of national bias to the selection procedure of judges and
shows that in figure skating, national bias increases with the
importance of the event. He also reveals vote trading in figure
skating, where judges reinforce national bias of other judges,
and compensation effects in ski jumping, where judges weaken
national bias of other judges.
A. Estimating national bias by modeling the heteroscedasticity
of judging errors in gymnastics
Judging in gymnastics and similar sports is a noisy process
and does not rely on comprehensive technical assistance.
Athletes are evaluated live by panels of judges, and the final
scores aggregate the individual marks given by these judges.
This aggregation process typically uses the median or the
trimmed mean to remove outliers and improve the accuracy of
the overall evaluation. Judges within a panel grade the same
performance but rarely agree on a single grade. They may have
individual preferences and interpret the scoring regulations
differently, but more importantly they do not detect the same
errors. Even experienced judges with sophisticated cognitive
judging strategies and sensorimotor experiences have a low
error detection rate [11]. This leads to an inevitable element
of subjectivity and randomness in the judging process which
introduces a natural variation in the marks given by judges.
This article is the second of a series of three articles on
sports judging. In the first article [12], we showed that the vari-
ation of the judging error in international gymnastic competi-
tions depends on the intrinsic quality of the performance of the
gymnasts: judges are more accurate judging the best athletes
than mediocre ones. We modeled and quantified the variance
of this judging error very accurately with heteroscedastic
random variables for each apparatus and discipline using data
from continental and international gymnastic competitions
held during the 2013–2016 Olympic cycle. In this work,
we integrate and leverage this knowledge of the distribution
of the judging error into our national bias model. Contrary
to previous regression-based analyses in gymnastics, e.g. by
Leskošek et al. [6], this allows us to quantify the national bias
not only on a nominal level but also in terms of the natural
variation of judging marks. This is essential to evaluate the
severity of the bias: the smaller the variance of the scores,
the less misjudgement is required to impact the ranking of the
gymnasts. After all, a national bias of 0.2 in favor of an athlete
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2deserving 5.7, with 10.0 being the maximum possible score, is
relatively small and has no impact at the top of a competition,
whereas the same bias in favor of an athlete deserving 9.7
is outrageous and can change the medalists at the Olympic
Games.
B. Summary of our results
We analyze national bias of execution and artistry judges
during the 2013–2016 Olympic cycle in the five gymnastic
disciplines: acrobatics, aerobics, artistics, rhythmics and tram-
poline. We show that national bias varies by discipline, by
nationality, and by judge. While acrobatics and trampoline
judges do not exhibit any national bias in favor of their
own athletes, we reveal significant bias in aerobic, artistic
and rhythmic gymnastics. Judges in men’s artistic gymnastics
are the worst offenders: their average over-scoring for their
compatriots is half the natural judging error, and this increases
to two thirds of the judging error in favor of their best
compatriots competing in the finals. We also show that judges
in all disciplines are unbiased against direct competitors of
their own athletes.
The bad news is that at the individual level, the national bias
of some judges is two and even three times the natural judging
error, which is egregious and unlikely unconscious or due to
chance. The good news is that in only one finals (an interna-
tional competition held in 2013) has this national bias modified
the podium in artistics gymnastics. The fact that this did not
occur more frequently is a testament to the efforts made by
the Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) to avoid
same-nationality judges in the finals whenever possible, and
to the aggregation mechanisms excluding the worst and best
marks from the judging panels. In the conclusion, we propose
steps to further decrease the impact of national bias, especially
in all-around finals in artistic and rhythmic gymnastics where
it is difficult to avoid same-nationality evaluations.
Note that in the third article of the series [13], we show that
the variance of the judging error has the same characteristic
heteroscedastic shape in other sports using judging panels and
marks within a finite range. The integration of this behaviour
could provide an improved national bias analysis in all these
sports.
II. JUDGING IN GYMNASTICS
The five main gymnastics disciplines recognized by the
Fédération Internationale de Gymnastique (FIG) are artis-
tic gymnastics, rhythmic gymnastics and trampoline, which
are Olympic sports, and aerobic gymnastics and acrobatic
gymnastics, which have a world championship held every
two years. Gymnastics disciplines have different apparatus
and competition formats. Acrobatic gymnastics routines are
performed in pairs or in groups; men, women and mixed
competitions are held. Aerobic gymnastics features individual
and group routines; group routines can be mixed or split by
gender. Artistic gymnastics is split by gender; men compete
on six apparatuses (floor exercise, parallel bars, horizontal bar,
pommel horse, still rings and vault) and women compete on
four (balance beam, floor exercise, uneven bars and vault).
Rhythmic gymnastics is only practised by women; it includes
individual routines with one apparatus (ball, club, hoop or rib-
bon) and group routines with one or two apparatus. Trampoline
is split by gender, but men and women compete in the same
events: individual and synchronized trampoline, double mini-
trampoline, and tumbling.
Gymnastics competitions typically consist of a qualifying
round followed by a final regrouping the best qualifiers.
A gymnastic routine at the international level is evaluated
by panels of judges focusing on the difficulty, artistry and
execution components of the performance. The final scores
and the rankings of the gymnasts are obtained by aggregating
the marks from the judges. The number of panels, the number
of judges per panel and the aggregation procedure vary per
discipline.
In this article we focus on execution judges in all the
disciplines, with the additional inclusion of artistry judges in
acrobatic and aerobic gymnastics1. After the completion of
a routine by the gymnast, each execution judge in the panel
grades the performance with a score from 0 to 10 at steps
of 0.1. The evaluation of a gymnastics routine is based on
precise guidelines specified in the Code of Points of each
discipline and apparatus [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]. All
the disciplines with the exception of trampoline can include
two reference judges who evaluate performances based on the
same criteria than execution and artistry panel judges, but with
increased weight if they strongly diverge from them.
III. DATA
The data, provided by the FIG2 and Longines3, encompasses
21 international and continental competitions held between
2013 and 2016, including the 2016 Rio Olympic Games.
Table I shows the size of the dataset by discipline after the
following preprocessing. The number of marks depends on
the number of performances in the dataset and the size of the
judging panels, the latter ranging from four to nine judges.
We analyze artistic and execution marks, including those
from reference judges, but exclude marks for the difficulty
component. We also exclude synchronized trampoline since
its panels are not amenable to analysis due to their small size.
We assume that national bias is marginal in aborted or poorly
executed routines because the risk for a judge of being accused
of cheating is not worth the potential benefits. We therefore
restrict the dataset to performances with a median panel score
of at least 7.0. This excludes 9.9% of the original data points.
Since we are interested in the raw marks reported by
judges, we disregard penalties outside their jurisdiction and
post-evaluation aggregation. We do not distinguish between
reference and regular panel judges, which are all part of a
single and enlarged panel for our analysis. This is further
justified from our previous work [12] showing that reference
and regular panel judges have a similar marking behavior.
We also show in [12] that artistry and execution judges in
acrobatic and aerobic gymnastics behave similarly.
1Besides acrobatic and aerobic gymnastics, the other disciplines do not
feature artistry judges.
2www.fig-gymnastics.com
3www.longines.com
3Nb. of Nb. of Nb. of same Nb. of direct
Discipline routines marks nationality marks competitors
Acrobatics 714 4’874 257 (5.3%) 843 (17.3%)
Aerobics 921 6’396 200 (3.1%) 757 (11.8%)
Artistics (M) 7’120 46’748 909 (1.9%) 3’006 (6.4%)
Artistics (F) 3’545 23’515 522 (2.2%) 1’694 (7.2%)
Rhythmics 2’636 17’673 405 (2.3%) 1’297 (7.3%)
Trampoline 1’483 7’278 343 (4.7%) 833 (11.4%)
Table I. Sample size by discipline.
Table I also shows the number of scores given to athletes
of the same nationality as the judge as well as their direct
competitors. The share of same-nationality scores is around
2%− 5%, depending on the discipline. Most same-nationality
scores occur in all-around finals where they are difficult to
avoid. We define direct competitors as gymnasts ranked imme-
diately ahead or behind an athlete of the same nationality as the
judge. A gymnast can have different competitors in qualifying
rounds and finals, and the number of direct competitors can
be higher than two if many gymnasts obtain the same score.
IV. METHODS
We develop our regression model starting with the mathe-
matical essence of judging: the score sp,j of performance p
by judge j is expressed as
sp,j = λp + p (1)
where λp is the unknown true quality of the performance and
p is a random error term. In gymnastics, the true performance
level λp is called the control score cp and typically gener-
ated by technical committees using post-competition video
reviews4. Since the control scores are unavailable for our
analysis, we assume that the judging panel is large enough
to provide a good approximation of the true performance
level. We use the median panel score cp , med
j
(sp,j) as an
approximation for λp to decrease the impact of biased and
erratic judges.
Refining this simple model, we consider the general ten-
dency µj of a judge who consistently applies the judging
regulations too harshly or too generously5. We then include the
national bias of a judge in favor of an athlete with the same
nationality with the binary variable 1SN. The extent of the
bias is determined by the parameter βSN and estimated by the
regression model. National bias does also occur by penalizing
direct competitors of same-nationality athletes; we integrate
this into the model with 1COMP and βCOMP. Our improved
model becomes
sp,j = cp + µj + βSN · 1SN + βCOMP · 1COMP + p. (2)
As done in our first article [12], we express the distance to
the control score cp in relation to the approximated standard
deviation of the judging error σˆd(c) for discipline d. We
4One could argue that the control score is still an approximation of the true
quality, although a very good one. This is further discussed in [12].
5µj is generally very small, i.e., below 0.02, however for some judges this
deviation reaches 0.2 points.
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Figure 1. Approximated standard deviation of judging error as a
function of the control score per discipline.
c 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5
σˆd(c) 0.31 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.09
Table II. Estimated standard deviation of judging error as a function
of the control score in men’s artistic gymnastics.
approximate σˆd(c) using a weighted least-squares exponential
regression using our data. We can derive this approximation
by discipline, apparatus, gender, and even by judge. In every
gymnastic except trampoline, a single approximation per dis-
cipline is sufficient. Figure 1 shows σˆd(c) as a function of c
for all the disciplines except trampoline and Table II shows
numerical values for men’s artistic gymnastics. For trampoline,
there are significant differences between apparatus, thus we do
one regression for σˆd(c) per apparatus. The results are shown
in Figure 2. Note that some curves are below zero for control
scores close to 10, but this is extrapolated and there is no
scoring data in that range.
This approximation of the judging variability allows to
describe the judge specific general error µj and the biases
(βSN, βCOMP) more precisely. We assume that they have similar
properties of heteroscedasticity: intentional and unintentional
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Figure 2. Approximated standard deviation of judging error as a
function of the control score per apparatus in trampoline.
4misjudgements are smaller for the best athletes. If the natural
variability decreases, any individual divergence away from
the remaining panel decreases as well. Being too far off the
panel score is very suspicious and is immediately noticed by
officials, and is usually unnecessary since a small difference
is sufficient to make an impact. We therefore suppose that
judges do adapt their scoring behaviour to not stand out,
no matter if their bias is intentional or not. We can thus
assess the individual general tendency µj and the national bias
(βSN, βCOMP) in terms of the approximated deviation of scores
σˆd(c). Our model becomes
sp,j = cp+(µj+βSN ·1SN+βCOMP ·1COMP) · σˆd(cp)+p. (3)
To restrict the number of variables in the regression model,
we estimate the general judge tendency µj beforehand as
µj = E
[
sp,j − cp
σˆd(cp)
]
(4)
which is the average judging error expressed as a multiple
of the natural deviation σˆd(c). Since we know cp, µj and
σˆd(cp), we can group cp and µj · σˆd(cp) together with the
reported judge score sp,j into a single variable. The resulting
response variable dp,j is the judging error corrected for the
judge specific tendency and given by
dp,j = (βSN · 1SN + βCOMP · 1COMP) · σˆd(cp) + p. (5)
Up to this point we did not specify the distribution of
the error term p. Based on our observations in [12], and
as discussed above, the distribution of the judging error for
discipline d is heteroscedastic in cp with mean zero and
standard deviation approximated by σˆd(cp). In [12], we go
further and calculate a marking score Mj for each judge
quantifying his/her accuracy as a factor of σˆd(cp). We thus
model the judging error of a specific judge j as a normal
random variable with mean zero and variance σ2d(cp) · M2j .
Putting everything together, our final regression model is
dp,j = (βSN · 1SN + βCOMP · 1COMP) · σˆd(cp) + p
where p ∼ N (0, σˆ2d(cp) ·M2j ) (6)
and can be solved with a generalized least squared estimator.
We can use Eq. (6) to estimate the national bias (βCOMP, βSN)
by apparatus, by discipline, by nationality and by judge.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. National bias by discipline
Table III shows the outcome of the general linear model
specified by Eq. (6). The results are split by discipline and
stage of the event. While ’All gymnasts’ encompasses all
performances in the dataset, ’Top 8 finalists’ only includes the
top eight gymnasts in the final stage of a competition (appa-
ratus and all-around finals). Because the general linear model
includes the functional heteroscedasticity variable σˆd(c), the
estimated parameters βSN and βCOMP are expressed in relation
to σˆd(c). For instance, βSN = 0.5 means that the bias level in
favor of same-nationality gymnasts is half the natural deviation
of marks for a specific performance level.
All gymnasts Top 8 finalists
Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
Acrobatics
βSN 0.04 (0.06) 0.08 (0.27)
βCOMP -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.08)
Aerobics
βSN 0.25*** (0.07) 0.50*** (0.15)
βCOMP -0.04 (0.04) -0.01 (0.06)
Artistics (M)
βSN 0.43*** (0.03) 0.68*** (0.11)
βCOMP -0.02 (0.02) -0.05 (0.03)
Artistics (F)
βSN 0.28*** (0.04) 0.55*** (0.13)
βCOMP -0.05* (0.02) 0.02 (0.04)
Rhythmics
βSN 0.34*** (0.05) 0.30 (0.19)
βCOMP -0.04 (0.03) -0.09 (0.06)
Trampoline
βSN -0.05 (0.05) 0.02 (0.12)
βCOMP -0.06 (0.03) -0.11* (0.07)
Significance codes: p < 0.01***, p < 0.05**, p < 0.1*
Table III. Regression results by discipline. Estimated parameters
(βSN, βCOMP) indicate the national bias in terms of the
approximated natural variation of marks σˆd(c). To obtain the
nominal bias for a given performance quality cp, multiply the
estimated parameter with σˆd(cp).
The results reveal that in aerobic, artistic and rhythmic gym-
nastics, judges mark same-nationality gymnasts significantly
higher than the other panel judges, whereas national bias is
not a systemic issue in acrobatic gymnastics and trampoline.
In aerobic and artistic gymnastics in particular, national bias is
even more pronounced for finalists than during earlier stages
of competitions, in other words judges bend the rules further
when it counts. This does not necessarily imply that the
nominal bias is higher for the best gymnasts since the natural
deviation of judging marks decreases as the performance level
improves, but instead that the magnitude of the national bias
compared to the other judging errors increases for the best
athletes.
The most severe bias appears in men’s artistic gymnastics,
where judges give gymnasts of the same country an average
bonus of almost half the natural variation, and an average
bonus of two thirds the natural deviation for the best finalists.
The best men artistic gymnasts in the world typically get
marks between 8.5 and 9.5 depending on the apparatus. Using
Figure 1 and Table II, the national bias βSN = 0.68 for the top
men finalists corresponds to a nominal bias of between 0.06
and 0.15 points depending on the apparatus, or 10% of the
total deductions of the performance. Considering the narrow
gaps between the best gymnasts, this is a worrying result, both
in relative and in absolute terms. We point out again that this is
for an average judge; the most biased judges are significantly
worse!
The results in Table III further show that the penalization of
direct competitors of same-nationality athletes is very small in
all the disciplines. This negative bias, even when statistically
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Figure 3. Estimated national bias by nationality in men’s artistic
gymnastics. We distinguish ’large countries’ with at least 15
same-nationality evaluations from ’small countries’.
significant, remains much smaller than the natural variation
of marks and therefore has a negligible impact on the final
rankings. This is in line with prior research [5], [4].
B. National bias by nationality and judge
We can apply our general linear regression model by
nationality and by judge. We first restrict the number of
variables by discarding the penalization of direct competitors,
which is negligible compared to the positive bias toward same-
nationality gymnasts. Figure 3 shows the estimated national
bias per country in men’s artistic gymnastics. The distribution
is right-skewed around βSN = 0.43 with a fat right tail
corresponding to the most biased countries. The histogram
further partitions the countries to differentiate ’large nations’
with reliable results from ’small nations’ with few data points.
The threshold is 15 same-nationality marks. Unsurprisingly,
small nations show a larger national bias variance than large
nations. We observe the same behavior in women’s artistic
gymnastics and rhythmic gymnastics.
Country Nb. of same-nationality marks Estimated national bias
Japan 24 0.916
Great Britain 37 0.761
South Korea 50 0.713
China 23 0.667
Belgium 22 0.657
Table IV. Countries with the highest national bias in men’s artistic
gymnastics. The list only includes countries with at least 15
same-nationality marks.
Tables IV-VI show the ’large nations’ with the worst
estimated national bias in men’s artistic gymnastics, women’s
artistic gymnastics, and rhythmic gymnastics, respectively. We
have less data in women’s artistic gymnastics and rhythmic
gymnastics, thus in both cases we set the threshold for large
nations at 10 same-nationality marks instead of 15. Eastern
European countries dominate the list in rhythmic gymnastics,
whereas Asian countries dominate in artistic gymnastics. South
Country Nb. of same-nationality marks Estimated national bias
Taiwan 11 1.208
South Korea 20 0.829
Russia 37 0.697
Italy 35 0.611
China 11 0.495
Table V. Countries with the highest national bias in women’s
artistic gymnastics. The list only includes countries with at least 10
same-nationality marks.
Country Nb. of same-nationality marks Estimated national bias
South Korea 23 0.822
Greece 10 0.721
Romania 13 0.697
Bulgaria 15 0.689
Estonia 10 0.483
Table VI. Countries with the highest national bias in rhythmic
gymnastics. The list only includes countries with at least 10
same-nationality marks.
Korea is among the worst three biased countries in all three
disciplines.
Figure 4 shows the estimated national bias per judge in
men’s artistic gymnastics. To illustrate the reliability of the
estimated parameters, we partition the judges to differentiate
’active judges’ with at least five same-nationality marks from
the other judges. Figure 4 exhibits a similar although more
spreaded right-skewness as Figure 3, and the variance of the
national bias is smaller for active judges. The worst judges
are for the most part not very active, thus their national bias
should to be taken with a grain of salt since it is supported by
very few data points. However, there are active judges whose
national bias is around twice the average judging deviation,
in other words their national bias is twice as large as all the
sources of error of an average judge. This is reprehensible, and
these judges should simply be forbidden to ever again judge
gymnastics competitions. Forbidding them to evaluate their
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Figure 4. Estimated national bias by judge in men’s artistic
gymnastics. We distinguish ’active judges’ with at least 5
same-nationality evaluations from other judges.
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judges from the Netherlands and South Korea.
own gymnasts is insufficient: if they show a large national
bias, it is likely that they are prone to other biases as well.
We must point out that it is difficult to infer systemic
national bias, or lack thereof, based on the average national
bias of a country. To illustrate this, Figure 5 shows the
estimated national bias of all the Dutch and South Korean
men’s gymnastics judges. Although the two countries have a
strikingly different average national bias (−0.12 versus 0.71),
one could argue that this is, at least partly, due to the appalling
bias of a single South Korean judge.
C. Impact of national bias on rankings
The regular and significant bias in favor of same-nationality
gymnasts naturally raises the question of its impact on the
competitions’ rankings. We study this further and focus on the
apparatus and all-around finals in artistic gymnastics. We apply
the scoring aggregation procedure as defined in the Codes of
Points [16], [17], and study ranking distortions by calculating
the rankings with and without the marks of same-nationality
judges. Whenever we observe a same-nationality mark, we
discard it and calculate the trimmed mean of the remaining
panel marks. If a discarded score comes from a reference
judge, the average reference score simply becomes the mark
of the second reference judge.
In the apparatus finals, 4 out of 740 performances in our
dataset include a same-nationality evaluation. For one of the
four gymnasts, the final score of the performance is boosted
by 0.267 points due to the national bias of a judge. The FIG
and the other athletes were lucky in this instance because the
gymnast in question finished last and far behind the other
finalists, and this scoring discordance had no effect on the
ranking. In most other instances a difference of this magnitude
would have improved the position of the gymnast by a few
ranks. This example further illustrates the danger of granting
more power to small panels of reference judges, who in the
aggregate are not better that regular panel judges. This is
discussed at length in our first paper on this topic [12].
In the all-around finals, evaluations by same-nationality
judges are more difficult to avoid and occur in 330 out of
1990 performances in our dataset. In 42% of these all-round
finals, removing the potentially biased same-nationality marks
changes the final ranking of the gymnasts, including one
podium. We propose mitigating measures in the next section.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this work, we studied the national bias of international
gymnastics judges during the 2013–2016 Olympic cycle. The
main novelty of our approach over prior work is that we
leverage and integrate the natural deviation of judging scores
into our national bias regression model. We have shown in
[12] that this natural judging error is heteroscedastic and can
be accurately modeled with weighted least-squares exponential
regressions. This allows us to express national bias as a
function of the natural judging error. Intuitively this makes
sense: judges are very accurate when evaluating the best
gymnasts, thus even a small nominal bias can have a lot of
impact on the ranking of the gymnast.
We estimate the national bias by discipline, by nationality
and by judge, and show important differences between the
least- and most-biased judges. National bias has the largest
impact in all-around competitions where it is impossible to
avoid same-nationality evaluations.
A. Recommendations
The FIG has already taken successful steps to decrease the
impact of national bias in gymnastics. We now discuss them
and propose additional mitigation measures.
1) Avoid same-nationality judges: The FIG already avoids
same-nationality judges in the apparatus finals. This is not
possible in all-around finals since they require too many
judges.
2) Increase the size of the judging panels: Large panels
are more robust because they decrease the impact of outlier
marks. Unfortunately, same-nationality judging situations are
already difficult to avoid in all-around finals; larger panels will
not solve this problem.
3) Get rid of the increased power imparted to reference
judges: In [12], we have shown that reference judges, who
are hand-picked by the FIG, are not better than regular
panel judges. We thus recommended that the FIG merges
the execution and reference judges into a larger execution
panel where all the judges have the same power. The FIG
Technical Coordinator is currently proposing the adoption of
our recommendation. This will prevent a biased reference
judge from strongly affecting the final scores of the gymnasts
due to its increased decision power.
4) Aggregate marks more aggressively: For all-around fi-
nals, where same-nationality evaluations are unavoidable, we
recommended that the FIG removes more extreme marks from
its panels before aggregating them with a (more aggressive)
trimmed mean, and even take the median panel mark. Tram-
poline already uses the median mark for each jump, but doing
the same thing for artistic or rhythmic gymnastics routines
would result in more ties. The FIG understandably does not
like to award ties, but this should not be an issue in all-
around finals since the final ranking includes scores from
7all the apparatus. Moreover, we believe that awarding two
gold medals to gymnasts whose performances are within the
margin of error of the best judges is a better outcome than
letting a biased judge act as the tiebreaker. Following our
recommendation, the FIG Technical Coordinator is currently
proposing to trim the best and worst two marks from its
execution panels for all the disciplines except trampoline,
which already uses the median. The resulting aggregation
would be the trimmed mean of the middle three scores in
artistic gymnastics, and the trimmed mean of the middle two
scores in aerobic, acrobatic and rhythmic gymnastics. This
change would apply to all the events, including all-around
finals.
5) Track the long-term performance of judges and remove
the worst culprits: The FIG recently started using an improved
Judge Evaluation Program (JEP) to assess the performance of
gymnastics judges [12]. JEP allows longitudinal monitoring of
the judges, many of whom are judging for decades. The bias
tool in JEP is not as refined as the analysis done in this article,
but it should nevertheless make it easier to highlight and get
rid of the most biased judges.
B. Future work
Accurate control scores provided by video review post-
competitions could allow us to refine our work on national
bias. In particular, we could investigate more complex judging
behavior in gymnastics such as vote-trading and compensation
effects revealed in figure skating and ski jumping [2], [3].
Further analysis should also include the serial positioning of
athletes to better understand the bias against direct competi-
tors of same-nationality gymnasts. Before a same-nationality
athlete has performed his/her routine, a judge vaguely knows
his/her direct competitors. After the routine, it is more clear
who the direct competitors are, and how much they should be
penalized. We expect to see a dependence of the national bias
on the positioning of the gymnasts.
National bias has been investigated in many other sports
besides gymnastics. In the third article of this series [13], we
show that the judging error variance in other sports with panels
of judges awarding marks within a finite range has a similar
heteroscedastic shape. The integration of this behaviour could
provide an improved national bias analysis in all these sports.
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